From the bottom up:
Southern Regions - Perspectives through conflict analysis and key political actors’ mapping of Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, and Lower Shabelle - RE-RELEASED APRIL 2014

With support from Conflict Dynamics International
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## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIAI</td>
<td>Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASWJ</td>
<td>Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWERU</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit</td>
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<td>CDI</td>
<td>Conflict Dynamics International</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENDF</td>
<td>Ethiopia National Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JVA</td>
<td>Juba Valley Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNGO</td>
<td>Local non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>Norwegian Church Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONLF</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>RKB</td>
<td>Ras Kamboni Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOYDEN</td>
<td>Somali Youth Development Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVA</td>
<td>Shabelle Valley Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFG</td>
<td>Somali Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>Somali National Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIS</td>
<td>Transitional Initiative for Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>Union of Islamic Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somalia Congress</td>
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Acknowledgements

The Somali CEWERU would like to acknowledge the support given to us by the people of Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, and Lower Shabelle regions by providing important information that made this exercise a success. We would also like to thank SOYDEN and the CEWERU field staff members who, despite difficult field conditions, helped organize community interviews enabling us to gather important information and produce an informed analysis of the conflict situation.

Hopefully this report provides an invaluable asset to local communities, the Somali Federal Government (SFG), other authorities in Somalia, and the international community, and will generate further discussion on how to develop robust and practical measures to transform the situation in conflict affected communities in Somalia.

Conflict Early Warning Early Response Unit (CEWERU)

The Somalia CEWERU together with the National Research Institute (NRI) SOYDEN has implemented a series of activities in the Somalia towns bordering Kenya and Ethiopia. The activities include:

• Linking and strengthening the local CEWERU structures along the Kenya-Somali and Ethiopia-Somali border for effective response to local conflict.
• The establishment of a national fund for rapid response to support local initiatives along the Kenya-Somali and Ethiopia-Somali border.
• Recruitment of volunteer Field Monitors in Lower Juba and Gedo regions with the aim to monitor, analyses and report conflict early warning indicators in order to enhance rapid response initiatives.
• Conducted conflict analysis and mapping in liberated regions in Central Somalia
• Training and capacity building for the CEWERU technical committees and other stakeholders on conflict and peacebuilding.
• Creation/identification of peace corridors/hotspots along the borders.
• Linkage between administration and cross-border communities and peace structures at the border.
• Formation/strengthening of district peace committees along the Somali border with Kenya and Ethiopia.

Objectives

1. Improving, strengthening and enhancing existing peace structures at the border area through effective capacity building strategies.
2. Establishment of cross-border community working groups that acts as a resource mobilization oversight council.
3. Providing technical trainings for the existing traditional and community based peace structures.
4. Enhancing the relationships that existed between CEWERU's of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia through peace committees.
5. Supporting and strengthening cross-border peace building institutions and district peace committees in Gedo and Lower Juba region.

www.somaliaceweru.org

Conflict Dynamics International (CDI)

Conflict Dynamics International's goal is to support the Somali people in exploring, reaching consensus around and implementing governance arrangements that can achieve lasting political accommodation. Conflict Dynamics works in partnership with Somali organizations across Somalia, and has partnered with SOYDEN on behalf of the Somali CEWERU to bring this important research to Somali communities and leaders.

www.cdint.org
From the Country Coordinator

It has been a long journey to where we are today. The Somali CEWERU would like to thank PEACE II, TIS/USAID and CEWARN for their continued support since 2007. Through hard work and patience in a very short time the Somali CEWERU has achieved a lot. I personally have had the opportunity to attend CEWARN/IGAD forums as a civil society representative focusing on conflict early warning strategic review. I have also seen the Somali CEWERU come out from the shadows of our more stable neighbors, like Kenya and Ethiopia. In the early days of our engagement with CEWARN there was always only just one Somali representative at the CEWARN/IGAD meetings, whereas today 10 Somalis participants attended the CEWERN/IGAD meeting to show case their achievements.

It has been a great experience supporting the Somali CEWERU and I look forward to seeing the institution expand their work in new border regions. I hope we will be able to host our regional neighbors in one of the forums in the near future and let them experience the warm Somali hospitality.

I hope this report will support the development of strategic peace and reconciliation efforts currently underway in Somalia today and that it will be a resource for both national and international peacebuilders.

I look forward to a great partnership with Somali-CEWERU and wish them the best in their work. Keep up the hard work and continue with your commitments to the greater society.

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I. Overview

For more than two decades, southern and central Somalia have been plagued by instability, violence, and armed conflict. Analysis tends to suggest that conflicts revolve around clan identities, which are exploited for political purposes. This has led to a focus on political reconciliation through clan power-sharing arrangements at the national level.

However, at the local and regional levels this type of analysis fails to acknowledge the significance of what can be termed ‘cultural conflict.’ Cultural conflict institutionalizes the systematic practice of social, economic, and political marginalization and exclusion of the ‘other.’ Often existing traditional structures, such as religious leaders, clan elders, or peace committees further entrench cultural conflicts.

Social Conflict

Social conflict refers to when groups oppose each other by exerting social power in an effort to control scarce resources. Resource-based conflicts are widespread in southern and central Somalia. Clan identities are politicized to advance resource, economic, or social interests intensifying differences between clans in southern Somalia. Trigger factors for clan conflict include land tenure, clan territorial expansion, grazing rights, water rights, farming rights, revenge killings, and political dominance issues. Often traditional institutions and mechanisms, such as xeer (customary law), religious leaders, clan elders, and peace committees are able to successfully negotiate and mediate recurring social conflicts. However, many peace agreements have not been adequately implemented—due for example to a lack of resources or a lack of inclusion—leading many social reconciliation processes to fail.

Cultural Conflict

Cultural conflict refers to conflict that occurs when different worldviews, cultural values, and beliefs clash. Marginalization and discrimination have heightened inter and intra-clan mistrust in the four regions covered, and hindered the establishment of stable local governance structures that support and serve all communities equitably. Social atrocities—including rape, forced marriages, forced labor, forced taxation, disappearances, and killings—are mechanisms by which dominant clans express and maintain their power over the ‘other’. This generates resentment and anger toward dominant clans and fuels violent conflict. Reports suggest that historically non-violent groups are now arming themselves and preparing to exact revenge against dominant clans.

In southern Somalia there is a cultural phenomenon that sees well-armed and well resourced ‘new settler’—referred to as galti or farac—communities in conflict with the unarmed ‘original inhabitant’—referred to as guri or asal—communities. Some communities commonly identified as galti may have inhabited the region for several generations but the division, or perception of division, remains and is an important factor in local conflict dynamics. Galtifarac communities from central regions migrated south and seized control of vital resources such as farmlands, often from their own clansmen, or from other non-armed groups. The consequences of these actions are largely unresolved in Gedo, Lower Juba, Middle Juba, and Lower Shabelle. Localized variations of xeer, negotiated before the arrival of galtifarac communities, are often disregarded by the ‘new settlers’, antagonizing inter-communal relations and contributing to conflict in the region. Based on this analysis new structures and mechanisms that are inclusive, transparent, and address historical grievances are needed.

Political Conflict

Political conflict refers to conflict between individuals and groups as they struggle to dominate formal political structures enabling them to control access to resources. Most efforts to establish local governance structures in southern Somalia have failed. Clan remains the primary institution of identity. Many Somalis continue to view the state as an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering those who control it and exploiting and harassing those who don’t. Power-sharing arrangements tend to leave smaller and marginalized clans feeling underrepresented and resistant to local authorities. A key lesson from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) District-Based Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Project (2006-2008) and Community Based Peace Support Project (2006-2008) was that locally-owned processes are vital and that early investment in genuine reconciliation is critical to the long-term success of new local governance structures.
II. Introduction

Instability in the late 1980s and the collapse of the state in 1991 resulted in two decades of warfare and violence across the country. Numerous efforts have since been directed at finding effective ways of resolving protracted conflicts throughout Somalia. To better understand conflict the Somali Conflict Early Warning Early Response Unit (CEWERU) conducted a conflict analysis and mapping exercise in all regions of southern Somalia between February and June 2013.\(^1\)

Conflict, which may be overt or covert, is a state of dissonance between incompatible or opposing persons, ideas, or interests. Conflict management requires an understanding of conflicts—their causes and duration (short-lived, intermittent, or protracted)—and must pay attention to the identities, interests, and concerns of the actors involved. Conflict mapping offers a better understanding of conflicts from a variety of perspectives, which can then form the basis for peacebuilding strategies.

This report presents the outcomes of a conflict mapping and analysis exercise conducted in four regions - Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, and Lower Shabelle. The report examines present and past conflict dynamics in each region with a focus on local stakeholders, social groups, political actors, governance structures, livelihood assets, and available social services. The analysis was conducted using the Conflict Assessment Framework and covered eight thematic issues: conflict profile; causes of conflict; conflict dynamics; actors; governance; security; infrastructure; and factors that can contribute to peace.\(^2\) The exercise combined a literature review, approximately 85 informant interviews and 400 focus group discussions, and direct field observation. In regions where significant areas are still under the control of the militant Islamist group al-Shabaab, the assessment team made sample visits to accessible areas and interviewed people from the region living in Mogadishu, Nairobi, and other towns. Validation workshops were held for all the regions to discuss the findings of the assessment with 85 stakeholders (see methodology in Annex 1).

The purpose of this conflict mapping exercise was to improve understanding of the conflicts in southern Somalia, and to contribute to better stabilization, reconstruction, local governance and development assistance. The report examines the past, present, and possible future clan- and politically-based conflicts in southern Somalia. The assessment also maps key political actors, including main stakeholders, social groups and clans, the security sector, and local governance structures. The assessment examines how relations between clans living in southern Somalia have changed in the last two decades, and provides an understanding of major conflicts that have taken place during this period. The report describes conflicts that have been resolved and highlights conflicts which could be reignited if al-Shabaab withdraw from the region. A report of this nature can never be exhaustive. This is an attempt to provide insight into the current situation. CEWERU will continue to build on this analysis.

Key Findings

Peace agreements in southern Somalia are not considered comprehensive and inclusive, and have therefore not been successfully implemented. Some communities support government involvement in reconciliation and peace processes. Others fear government engagement due to past experiences of clan-biased authorities.

Peace processes must be inclusive and locally led and owned. Local governance structures are essential peacebuilding resources. Peacebuilding and reconciliation, where all historical grievances are acknowledged, are the foundations for the successful establishment of new local administrations. Power-sharing agreements will fail if marginalized clans feel underrepresented in local administrations.

Inter- and intra-clan animosities and mistrust hinder the establishment of stable local governance structures that support and serve all clans equitably. Fear of domination and marginalization by dominant clans, via access to resources, patronage politics, and a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, is the basis of political competition. The Somali Federal Government (SFG) and local authorities must address mistrust between clans for peace processes to succeed.

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1. The Somali Conflict Early Warning Early Response Unit (CEWERU) with support from USAID conducted a conflict analysis and mapping exercise in recently liberated areas of southern and central Somalia between 23 May and 20 August 2012. This conflict mapping and analysis included a series of five assessment reports for the newly accessible regions of Somalia including: Galgaduud, Hiraan, Bay, Bakool and Middle Shabelle. This report adds new information for Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, and Lower Shabelle.

Resource-based conflict remains widespread in southern Somalia. Conflicts are often initiated by well-armed galti/farac ('new settler') communities against guri/asal ('original inhabitant') communities. Galti/farac communities from central regions migrated south throughout the twentieth century and seized control of local resources. Guri/galti and fara/asal hostilities and mistrust remain largely unresolved.

Atrocities, including rape, forced marriage, forced labor, forced taxation, and killings, are used as tools for oppression. In the southern regions, especially in Lower Juba, Middle Juba, and Lower Shabelle, atrocities are a mechanism by which dominant clans express and maintain their position of power breeding resentment among weaker clans.

Rumors and misinformation remain key conflict drivers. Somali society is largely an oral one and during the civil war rumors played an important role in maintaining tribal alliances, creating fear and propagating violence. Rumors are used as political tools – given strong clan ties rumors spread quickly – and are thus an effective means to gather support or undermine others. Once a rumor begins circulating it is extremely difficult to find a way to counteract the damage.

Opportunities

A multipronged conflict transformation and peacebuilding mechanism is recommended for the regions covered in this report focusing on local reconciliation, enhancing local capacity for peace projects, provision of social services, and support for livelihood activities. Activities should be implemented in an integrated manner. The aim is to help stakeholders with different perspectives to engage in structured and coherent debate about the various factors that affect livelihoods, their relative importance, and the ways in which they interact.

The following activities are required to establish viable local government structures:

- **Transitional justice mechanisms.** Scarce resources are dedicated to visible public works while little is directed to justice and healing mechanisms. While mistrust and hatred between clans is so strong coming to terms with the past is an important foundation for building sustainable peace, local government, stability, and development. Peacebuilding and reconciliation are the foundations for viable local government structures.

- **Community-centered dialogue.** Platforms for reconciliation should be established and strengthened at the district and village level. Local reconciliation should include admission of guilt among the clans, with perpetrators admitting their wrongs. Third party actors should be part of mediation processes in hotspots identified locally.

- **Return of properties.** Property has unlawfully changed hands throughout the prolonged period of conflict. Long-term support should be made available to address this core driver of conflict. An extensive public awareness campaign should be launched to help residents understand the importance of settlement as a means of promoting peace.

- **Politically accommodating arrangements to ensure equitable power and resource sharing.** Local administrative structures should ensure all local clans are sufficiently represented. Resources, such as revenues, should be equitably distributed to all communities. Politically accommodating arrangements are required to prevent a ‘winner takes all’ approach to local politics. The only way for this to happen is if local government structures are created through a local reconciliation process.

- **Trust-building initiatives.** The Somali Federal Government (SFG) should adopt a consultative approach to gain the confidence of local communities. Efforts should be directed towards building clan-neutral government institutions. Reconciliation processes supported by the SFG should foster integration and trust between clans. This approach should be integrated into national development policies and programs.

- **Training of new administrators and devolution of authority to regional administrations.** The SFG should initiate and support the devolution of power to regional administrations. International development programmes conducted through community contracting should be encouraged.

The following approaches should be considered to enhance local capacity for peace:
• **Peace committees.** Local peace committees, that are inclusive and representative, should be formed in towns and villages to receive and respond to grievances, and to act as intermediaries between government agencies and the local community. Peace committees should represent all local clans and social groups, including the religious and business communities, and women and youth groups.

• **Supporting the formation of local council of elders.** In order to restore the credibility of local elders supporting grass-root reconciliation efforts at the district level can be done through the formation of district level council of elders.

• **Conflict monitoring.** Adequate measures should be established to identify early warning signs of escalating conflict. In collaboration with local officials and the peace committees the public should be encouraged to play an active role in conflict monitoring.

• **Rotational leadership.** Until free and fair elections can be held, local administration leadership should be rotational ensuring equal opportunities for all groups in the community to lead. All local administrations should operate with a fixed term and support the induction of incoming administrations.

• **Engagement of religious scholars to counter al-Shabaab influence.** The ideology and influence of al-Shabaab cannot be countered by military action alone. Islamic Scholars should be engaged to counter the misrepresentation of Islam by violent groups. Dialogue should be initiated between competing religious groups to foster sustainable reconciliation.

• **Government as facilitator.** The SFG should facilitate dialogue between competing communities and initiate discussions on critical issues that could trigger conflict, ensuring equal participation of all clans.

The productive employment of all communities is necessary to ensure sustainable peace. Recommendations, according to market sector, are provided below:

• **Agriculture**
  The regions of southern Somalia are extremely fertile. Agricultural potential has been limited by protracted conflict and the destruction of agricultural equipment and infrastructure. Agricultural development can be supported by providing farmers with tools, machinery, fertilizers, and appropriate seeds. Technical training, and investment in transport infrastructure and security will further improve productivity, and increase household access to food.

• **Livestock**
  The regions of southern Somalia maintain excellent grazing areas. Livestock potential has been limited by stock shortages (particularly following the 2011 famine), inaccessibility of pastures due to insecurity, and inaccessibility of veterinary services. Support to the livestock sector should focus on restocking, provision of training for community animal health workers, rebuilding water pans, and the establishment of enclosures for growing animal fodder.

• **Fishing**
  There is strong potential in the fishing sector in the coastal regions of Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba. Fishing related activities—including fish processing, cold storage, and drying and canning of processed products—are underdeveloped. The realization of the region’s potential can be supported through the provision of boats and nets, technical training, and investment in transport infrastructure, storage facilities, and the rehabilitation of fishing ports.

• **Trade**
  Income-generating activities have been hampered by an unstable political environment, a lack of marketing and management skills, low purchasing power of the population, and insufficient support from local authorities. Interventions should target the most vulnerable groups in society such as women and youth. Communities should be provided with startup capital and training. Market opportunities will emerge and expand with the restoration of peace.
III. Gedo

Introduction: Gedo

Gedo is an administrative region of Somalia that lies on the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya, and shares borders with the four Somali regions of Bay, Bakool, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba. The region has six districts - Dolo, Belet-Hawa, Luuq, El Wak, Garbaharey, and Bardera. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Somalia statistics of 2005, the region has an estimated population of 328,378 persons. The region is home to the following major clans: Marehan (Darod) in all districts, Sheikhal (Hawiye) and Dir sub-clans in Luuq; Garre (Rahanweyn) in El Wak; Asharaf and Gabaweyn (Rahanweyn) in Dolo/Luuq; and Ajuran (Hawiye), Auliyahan (Ogaden/Darod), Jareer (Somali Bantu), and Rahanweyn sub-clans in Bardera.

The major political and security organizations struggling for control in the region include al-Shabaab, Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah (ASWJ), the Somali National Army (SNA), Ethiopia-backed district administrations, Kenya-backed district administration, Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), and Kenya Defense Forces (KDF).

Most of Gedo’s districts have been freed from al-Shabaab, except for the key town of Bardera and parts of El Wak, Luuq, and Garbaharey. It should be noted that although currently there is relative stability in the region, there are incidences of insecurity and clashes where inter- and intra-clan conflicts have re-emerged following the removal of al-Shabaab.

The principal economic activities in the region are livestock rearing and farming. Trade between Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia is important for the region, creating a fairly stable economic environment in the border towns. Thus, despite the repeated conflicts during the last 20 years, the economy has been thriving due to cross-border trade. Other sectors, including agriculture and the telecom business, are also present in the region.

Key Findings: Gedo

- Although currently there is relative stability in the region, there are incidences of insecurity and clashes where inter- and intra-clan conflicts have re-emerged following the removal of al-Shabaab.
- Northern Gedo experienced more clan- and resource-based conflicts than other parts of the region prior to al-Shabaab take-over in 2009.
- The principal economic activities in the region are livestock, farming, and cross-border trade with Kenya and Ethiopia.
- The conflict in Gedo has spill over impacts in neighboring countries Ethiopia and Kenya.
- Social services are either minimal or non-existent. Some NGOs and Diaspora provide support mainly in the education and health sectors.
- The region is very remote and lacks basic infrastructure except in some border towns. The principle economic activity in the region revolves around livestock and livestock products, farming and small scale trade.
- The drivers of conflict are territorial control, resource control, political marginalization and exclusion, and ideology. The districts of Luuq, Belet Hawa and Bardera are regional flash points.
- The Marehan in Gedo include guri (‘original inhabitant’) communities and galti (‘new settler’) communities who have been divided into competing political groups.

History of Conflict: Gedo

Clan conflict (territorial control, resources control): Northern Gedo experienced more clan-based resource conflicts than other parts of the region before the al-Shabaab take-over in 2009. The major inter-Marehan clan conflict in northern Gedo included the Rer Dini and Rer Ahmed on one side, and Rer Hassan, Hawarsame, Ali Dhore, and Fiqi Yaqub on the other side, with the latter group enjoying support from Ethiopia.
Garbaharey District hosts the regional headquarters and is the most Marehan homogenous district in Gedo Region. Since the civil war Garbaharey has been subject to intra-Marehan rivalries over control of the administration. There continues to be weak relationships between the Rer Hassan, Rer Garad, and Rer Siyad in Garbaharey. After a period of conflict, the sub-clans made peace and agreed on free trade on all trade routes. This agreement broke down when a Rer Hassan car hijacker was killed by a Rer Siyad militia at a check point in Burdubow, leading to conflict between Rer Hassan and Rer Siyad militias in Garbaharey, Burdubow, and Tulla Barwaqo. Intra-clan rivalry continued through 2009 when Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab forces took over, generating disputes between the two groups. Al-Shabaab prevailed and assigned nonlocals to head the regional administration. SNA and ASWJ forces pushed al-Shabaab from Garbaharey town in 2011 but the group is still present in Burdubow town on the banks of the Juba River.

Luq is a cosmopolitan district which has experienced conflicts between the Marehan and Rahanweyn sub-clans over control of land and the local administration. The agro-pastoralist Rahanweyn communities include both the Digil and Mirifle. The Mai speaking Rahanweyn sub-clans have long felt marginalized by Somali speakers and have a better relationship with Hawiye sub-clans that border them in Lower Shabelle and Benadir regions to the east than with the Marehan (Darod) sub-clans that border them to the west. During the war, Marehan militias looted Rahanweyn grain stores prompting Rahanweyn communities to join the Somali National Alliance and fight the Marehan. There are frequent conflicts between Gabaweyn (Digil/Rahanweyn) farming communities and the pastoralist Marehan. The Gabaweyn claim that Marehan communities are occupying their farms and displacing them from the district. The majority of Gabaweyn who left during the civil war have not yet returned. Marehan and Dir sub-clans were at peace until they fought in Galgaduud (central Somalia) after former TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf created a district called Herale belonging to Dir sub-clans within territory the Marehan perceived as theirs.

Marginalization and exclusion: There are many conflicts in Gedo Region caused by segregation and marginalization, and driven by inferiority-superiority complexes. Targets of this marginalization include non-Marehan sub-clans as well as the Hawarsame and Fiqi Yaqub (both are Marehan sub-clans but considered to be lower-caste groups). The Marehan constitute the majority of communities in Gedo Region. There has been tension between Marehan and non-Marehan communities over political control of some districts, such as the armed conflict between Marehans and Garre over control of El Wak in 2005. Currently the Governor and five of six DCs are Marehan. The region is also home to minority social groups including Rahanweyn sub-clans, Dir sub-clans, Garre (Rahanweyn), Gabaweyn (Digil/Rahanweyn), Asharaf, Ajuran, Sheikhal (both Hawiye), Jareer (Somali Bantu), and Auliyahan (Ogaden/Darod). Minority clans feel that they have been marginalized politically, economically, and militarily by the Marehan.

Sectarian conflicts: Gedo Region experienced widespread sectarian conflict with both al-Shabaab and ASWJ fighting for political control of the region. Manipulation and politicization of religion as a tool for gaining power led to the globalization of the Somali conflict. The net result has been the diminished role of genuine Somali religious leaders to the benefit of religious extremists.

- Al-Shabaab are seeking political and economic control of the region, and providing a safe haven and logistics for global jihadists. At their height the group had an effective administrative system, with a strong intelligence network, extensive business networks, and external support. In recent years they have grown increasingly unpopular, and are now not supported in Gedo. They are blacklisted as a terror group by the international community and have a record of appalling human right violations and no relationships with the neighboring states of Ethiopia and Kenya.
- ASWJ, consisting largely of moderate Sufi Muslims, are fighting against the strict religious agenda espoused by al-Shabaab. They are not listed as terrorist groups by the international community. Ethiopia, the SFG, and the local population support them in the region. They currently have a military presence in Gedo Region though the organization’s governance structure remains unclear.

Cross-border conflict and the spillover effect among clans in Gedo Region: The conflict in Gedo has had spillover effects in Kenya and Ethiopia. Many of the clans in Gedo have members residing in neighbouring countries. When clans are in conflict in Gedo their relatives in Kenya and/or Ethiopia often join the conflict.
Cross-Border Clan Conflicts

Garre
- Kenya: Mandera, Moyale, Marsabit, Isiolo, Wajir
- Ethiopia: Liban Zone
- Somalia: Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Shabelle

Marehan
- Kenya: Mandera, Wajir, Garissa
- Ethiopia: Liban Zone
- Somalia: Gedo, Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Galgaduud

Ajuran
- Kenya: Wajir
- Somalia: Gedo, Middle Juba, Bay

Rahanweyn
- Kenya: Mandera
- Somalia: Gedo, Bay, Bakool

Dir
- Ethiopia: Liban Zone
- Somalia: Gedo, Lower Juba, Galgaduud, Hiran

Ogaden
- Kenya: Mandera, Wajir, Garissa
- Ethiopia: Liban Zone
- Somalia: Gedo, Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Bakool
This results in inter-clan conflicts across borders. Many of the warring clans in Somalia have a presence in each of the three countries as shown in the figure on the previous page. For example, the Geriley township on the Kenya border has been prone to community tensions related to cross-border crime and business competition.

**Guri vs. galti**: The Marehan in Gedo include *guri* (‘original inhabitant’) communities and *galti* (‘new settler’) communities who are often divided in competing political groups. Today the *guri-galti* conflict is reflected in the leadership of the region. Mistrust between the two groups is based on a lack of power-sharing mechanisms.

**Key Political Actors: Gedo**

Political actors are critical players in conflicts affecting Gedo Region. Vying for territorial control has been the predominant factor inciting conflict and making political engagement difficult.

The key political actors in the region are:

**Ethiopia National Defence Forces (ENDF):** The ENDF are aligned with ASWJ and the SNA against al-Shabaab. The Ethiopians have played a role in appointing local district commissioners (DCs). Keen to secure its borders, the ENDF crossed into Gedo Region to attack al-Ilthiadh al-Islamiya’s (AIAl) bases in 1996. Ethiopia is also keen to establish a local administration that will not provide support to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), fighting for independence in Ethiopia’s Somali Region. Ethiopia’s interest in Gedo Region extends to the whole Juba Valley, in line with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Grand Stabilization Plan for South Central Somalia with Kenya, and the creation of the regional Jubaland State.

**Somali National Army (SNA):** The SNA in Gedo Region consists of several groups. Part of the SNA in Gedo Region is made up of ASWJ and local clan militias supported by the ENDF. Another part is made up of the ‘Isiolo troops’ who were trained in Isiolo in Kenya and entered Somalia alongside the KDF in February 2011. Currently the five accessible districts consider themselves aligned with the SFG. In late 2011 and early 2012 there were two opposing local administrations with two governors in the region, one backed by Ethiopia and the other by Kenya. However, the SFG recently appointed the former deputy governor, Mohamed Abdi Kalil, to be the new governor of Gedo Region. The former governor, Hussein Sheikh Abdi Ismael has not accepted the SFG appointment.

**Al-Shabaab:** Al-Shabaab controls parts of El Wak, Luuq, Garbaharey, and all of Bardera. The group seized administrative control of Gedo from local warlords in 2008. Reports suggest that the area was subsequently stable for the first time in five years. After a year in power their tactics became more predatory with targeted killings of anyone perceived to oppose them and an increased ‘tax’ burden on businesses. Until they took control of the region, violent conflict between rival clans and sub-clans was common. Al-Shabaab rule ensured there was no clan conflict over natural resources.

**Kenya Defence Forces (KDF):** The KDF are relatively new actors in the Somali context. Prior to Kenya’s military incursion in 2011, security on the Kenyan side of the border was deteriorating due to attacks blamed on al-Shabaab. Kenya has been instrumental in pushing for the creation of a regional Jubaland State to serve as a buffer zone preventing al-Shabaab incursions into Kenyan territory. Independent business elements are following events in Jubaland carefully due to the economic importance of the area linking Kismayo, Kenya, and other parts of the region.

**Ahlul Sunnah wal Jamaah (ASWJ):** ASWJ’s southern branch, based in Gedo, signed an agreement with the SFG in April 2013 to fully integrate its forces into the SNA and for the SFG to start paying troops based in the four districts under their control including Dolo, Belet Hawa, Luuq, and Garbaharey. At the time of writing ASWJ had still received no payments from the government.

**Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD):** The common interests of Kenya and Ethiopia, to instability spreading beyond Somalia’s borders, formed the basis for the 2012 IGAD Grand Stabilization Plan for South Central Somalia, which seeks to establish the rule of law and local administrations, and to promote reconciliation through the creation of the regional Jubaland State.
South West State of Somalia: Prominent Digil and Mirifle stakeholders are attempting to establish South West State of Somalia comprised of the six regions of southern Somalia. In 2013 several Marehan clan leaders supported the idea as a possible response to an Ogaden dominated Jubaland State comprised of Gedo, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba.

Clan Elders: The traditional role of Gedo Region’s clan elders in resolving conflicts was weakened by the civil war. Clan elders have been manipulated, politicized, and used as tools by warlords, factional leaders, and other interest groups. In a culture of violence, warlords often usurped the authority of elders as representatives of the clan. Gedo Region has a long history of clan conflict. Complex inter- and intra-clan violence in the region is deeply rooted in traditional causes of conflict, such as water and pasture scarcity.

Clan Analysis: Gedo

Marehan: The Marehan in Gedo Region include the guri and galti who have often been divided into competing political groups. The definition and classification of guri and galti varies in different parts of Somalia. Historically, the majority of Somalis were nomadic pastoralists moving throughout the region in search of fresh pastures for their livestock. Marehan clans first migrated to the area now referred to as Gedo Region in the nineteenth century. Guri Marehan communities developed traditional leadership systems and customs in peaceful co-existence with neighbouring clans.

Dir: Dir sub-clans are primarily found in Luuq District. Marehan and Dir sub-clans were at peace until they fought in Galgaduud following the creation of a new district designated for Dir clans in territory traditionally considered Marehan. The conflict was resolved but tensions remain and are related to control of Luuq. Dir sub-clans are strong supporters of the southern ASWJ force and have historical alliances with various Ogaden, Rahanweyn, and Garre communities.

Garre: Garre (Rahanweyn) sub-clans are primarily found in El Wak District. Garre-Marehan tensions are profound and driven by competition for control and ownership of El-Wak town. Tensions are most pronounced in El Wak where the Garre are a majority in the town though a minority in the district. Traditionally Garre and guri Marehans sub-clans have had stronger relations compared to those with galti Marehan sub-clans. In July 2005 the largely Marehan-based Juba Valley Alliance under Barre Hiraale seized El Wak town from the Garre. The Garre-Marehan Peace Agreement of 2005, brokered with support from Kenya, led to the withdrawal of the Marehan militia. This agreement has been respected and enforced by traditional elders and religious leaders from both clans.

Capacity of Current Government Administration: Gedo

Gedo Region has six administrative districts - Dolo, Belet-Hawa, Luuq, El Wak, Garbaharey, and Bardera. Luuq, Dolo, Belet-Hawa, and Garbaharey have local government structures supported by Ethiopia. There is also a local administration in El Wak that has been supported by Kenya.

Access to services: The region is very remote and lacks basic infrastructure. There is no running water other than private boreholes in all districts. Local non-government organizations (LNGOs) provide Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) programs periodically in each of the districts. Modest government offices and social services such as clinics, schools, and airstrips are found in all districts. There are many primary schools in all districts which are either sponsored by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) or funded by other agencies, the diaspora, or the local community. Agencies operating in the area conduct training for teachers and head teachers. There is a proliferation of Koranic schools in all districts. Towns such as Bardera, Garbaharey, and El Ade have secondary level schools. Gedo’s first university, the University of Gedo is located in Bardera and was established by the diaspora in 2008. In 2012 the campus was temporarily closed due to conflict with students transferred to the University of Mogadishu. It is hoped that the university will reopen when the situation improves.

Dolo District: Dolo District is situated in the north-west of Gedo Region. The district headquarters are located in Dolo city. The city is located at the intersection of the Juba and Dawo rivers near the border with Ethiopia. At the start of 2012, local peace groups mapped latent conflict among militias and warlords as the principal issue causing tension in Dolo District. Like other districts of Gedo Region, Dolo District has experienced both inter- and intra-clan conflicts, for example:
• There have been periodic clashes between Rer Ahmed (Marehan) pastoralists and Gabaweyn (Rahanweyn) farmers, herders, and clan elders in Geedweyn town and Dhaysiyow village. Religious leaders have initiated dialogue between the conflicting clans.

• In Baba Cadaley, Shidle, and Sadhumay villages, conflicts over land and water have been contained by clan elders through customary law.

• In Bojidher there was a dispute over a cash transfer program involving the community, the distributing NGO, and the former-TFG administration. This has not yet been resolved.

• In Tosiley there has been a seasonal conflict over access to farming land between Rer Ahmed (Marehan) and Hawarsame (Marehan). Although community elders arbitrated, realization of peace has been stalled by delayed payment of diya (blood money).

• In Gubadhinya, there is active conflict between Rer Ahmed (Marehan) and Fiqi Yaqub (Marehan) over access to water sources and rangeland.

Belet-Hawa District: Belet-Hawa District is situated where the Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia borders meet. The district is inhabited primarily by Marehan sub-clans. Since the state collapse in 1991, Belet-Hawa district has experienced endless intra-clan conflict between Marehan sub-clans. The Marehan sub-clans in Belet-Hawa include Ali Dhere, Hawarsame, Rer Ahmed, and Fiqi Yaqub. Local peace groups mapped the following conflict issues in Belet-Hawa district:

• Latent conflicts over natural resources (wells, markets, check-points, and food distribution centers).

• Latent conflicts over public land.

• Latent conflicts over access to the local administration.

• External interventions by neighboring countries.

Conflicts are being addressed by clan elders, women groups, youth groups, religious leaders, and local administrators.

Luuq District: Luuq District is a cosmopolitan district that has experienced conflicts between the Marehan and Rahanweyn over control of land and the local administration. Conflict has also occurred between the Marehan and Dir sub-clans over the same issue. Al-Shabaab controlled Luuq in 2010, resisting attacks from Marehan militias and ASWJ (with strong Dir clan involvement). In 2011 al-Shabaab was pushed out by pro-TFG forces under General Abdullahi Ismail Fartaag with ENDF support. Marehan dominance in the local administration was subsequently re-established.

El Wak District: El Wak District is home to Marehan and Garre sub-clans. There has been tension and fighting between the Marehan and Garre clans over political control of El Wak. Tensions among Marehan sub-clans are also evident in El Wak over the sharing of parliamentary seats. In El Wak there were tensions in mid-2012 over sharing of political positions among guri Marehan factions. The Urmidig received a constituency in El Wak while the Wagardac, who are minorities in El Wak and affiliated with the Talhe in rural areas, received a constituency in Galgadud.

Local peace groups recorded the following conflicts in El Wak district:

• Ongoing conflict between SNA and KDF against al-Shabaab.

• Resource conflicts between Garre and Ali Dhere (Marehan).

• Land disputes involving Urmidig and Rer Yusuf (Marehan) with an active peace process ongoing.

• Conflict over relief distribution involving the community, NGOs, and the former-TFG administration. Peace processes have been attempted with no success to date.

Garbaharey District: Garbaharey District is the regional headquarters and the most Marehan homogenous district of Gedo Region. Since the civil war Garbaharey has been subject to intra-Marehan rivalries over territorial control, control of the administration, and control of trade opportunities. Rer Hassan, Rer Garad, and Rer Siyad (all Marehan) are the majority groups in Garbaharey district. Other smaller clans in the district are the Gabaweyn and Gasargude.
(both Rahanweyn). Currently SNA and ASWJ forces have liberated Garbaharey town from al-Shabaab but the group are still present outside of the district headquarters in Burdhubo. It should be noted that although Garbaharey town is no longer controlled by al-Shabaab, confrontations with the SNA, ASWJ, and the ENDF continue in both Garbaharey and Bardera. After the regional listening tour by the SFG in April 2013 the Prime Minister nominated the former Rer Hassan deputy governor, Mohamed Abdi Kalil, to be governor of the region.

**Bardera District:** Bardera District is located in the south of Gedo Region. Unlike other districts in Gedo, Bardera District is multicultural with many diverse clans residing in the district, including the Marehan, Rahanweyn sub-clans, Ajuran, Jareer, and Ogaden. The Talhe, Rer Ugaas Shammarke, and Bahaguled (all Marehan) have tense relations over control for power, trade, pasture, and farm lands in Bardera. During the civil war, business in Bardera was dominated by Somali Arabs. Open lands and public places were settled by IDPs. Disagreements between Rer Ugaas Shammarke and Talhe over control of district administration and trade routes have resulted in frequent conflict among Marehan sub-clans.

**Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Gedo**

The most common forms of conflict in Gedo are:

- **Clan resource conflict:** Clan conflicts are primarily based on competition over resources such as land, grazing rights, water, livestock theft, and humanitarian aid, or are motivated by revenge killings.

- **Political conflict:** Conflict among political organizations is based on political control and influence of the region. Political organizations often come in the form of neighboring state actors (Ethiopia and Kenya), religious/political organizations (including al-Shabaab and ASWJ), and clans promoting their own political agendas.

**Conflict Profile: Gedo**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Intermittent since 1991</td>
<td>Belet-Hawa, Luuq, and Dolo districts</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan Fiqi Yaqub &amp; Hawarsame vs. Ali Dhere &amp; Rer Ahmed</em></td>
<td>Political representation and access to resources.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Intermittent since 1991</td>
<td>All districts</td>
<td><em>Guri vs. galti Marehan</em></td>
<td>Political representation and access to resources.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Intermittent since 1991</td>
<td>Bardera District</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan Talhe vs. Rer Ugaas Shamarke vs. Bahaguled</em></td>
<td>Political representation and access to resources.</td>
<td>Inactive &amp; unresolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Intermittent since 1991</td>
<td>Garbaharey District</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan Rer Garad &amp; Rer Siyad vs. Rer Hassan</em></td>
<td>Political representation.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Since 2009</td>
<td>Bardera District</td>
<td><em>Inter-Clan Talhe &amp; Urmidig (Marehan) vs. Ogaden</em></td>
<td>Political representation, access to resources, and cross-border trade.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Since 2009</td>
<td>El Wak District</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan Sonfure vs. Urmidig vs. Wagardac</em></td>
<td>Political representation.</td>
<td>Inactive &amp; unresolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Intermittent since 1991</td>
<td>Dolo District</td>
<td><em>Inter-Clan Rer Ahmed (Marehan) vs. Gabaweyn (Rahanweyn)</em></td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Intermittent since 1991</td>
<td>Dolo District</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan Rer Ahmed vs. Hawarsame</em></td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Intermittent since 1991</td>
<td>Dolo District</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan Rer Ahmed vs. Fiqi Yaqub</em></td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Type of Conflict</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Political Representation and Access to Resources</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
<td>Luuq</td>
<td><em>Inter-Clan</em></td>
<td>Rahanweyn &amp; Dir vs. Marehan</td>
<td>Political representation and access to resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
<td>El Wak</td>
<td><em>Inter-Clan</em></td>
<td>Marehan vs. Garre</td>
<td>Political representation, access to resources, and cross-border trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Dolo</td>
<td><em>Inter-Clan</em></td>
<td>Garre vs. Degodia</td>
<td>Political representation and cross-border trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Since early 2000s</td>
<td>El Wak</td>
<td><em>Inter-Clan</em></td>
<td>Garre vs. Ali Dhere (Marehan)</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Since late 1990s</td>
<td>El Wak</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan</em></td>
<td>Urmidig vs. Rer Yusuf</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Since early 2000s</td>
<td>El Wak</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan</em></td>
<td>Rer Kula vs. Barah</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Since early 2000s</td>
<td>El Wak</td>
<td><em>Inter-Clan</em></td>
<td>Garre vs. Marehan</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>El Wak</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan</em></td>
<td>Rer Yusuf vs. Urmidig</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Belet-Hawa</td>
<td><em>Inter-Marehan</em></td>
<td>Carcasa</td>
<td>Specific food aid distribution conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Belet-Hawa</td>
<td><em>Inter-Marehan</em></td>
<td>Harir Hosle</td>
<td>Destruction of property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
<td>Dolo</td>
<td><em>Inter-Clan</em></td>
<td>Rer Ahmed (Marehan) vs. Gabaweyn (Rahanweyn)</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
<td>Dolo</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan</em></td>
<td>Rer Ahmed</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
<td>Dolo</td>
<td><em>Inter-Clan</em></td>
<td>All clans in Gedo</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Since 2011</td>
<td>Dolo</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan</em></td>
<td>Bojidher</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
<td>Dolo</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan</em></td>
<td>Rer Ahmed vs. Hawarsame</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
<td>Dolo</td>
<td><em>Intra-Marehan</em></td>
<td>Rer Ahmed vs. Fiqi Yaqub</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gedo Conflict Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>RESULT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>Active inter-clan conflicts between USC and Marehans</td>
<td>Re-escalation of clan conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1995</td>
<td>UNITAF/UNISOM Intervention</td>
<td>Regional administration in Gedo formed by UNISOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>Conflict between SNF and Al-Itihad. Ethiopia troops supported SNF in this conflict</td>
<td>Disintegration of Al-Itihad after they were defeated in Luuq. Several members of Al-Itihad defected to Mogadishu and formed a new group called Al-Ictisaam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>Inter-SNF conflict (Marehans)</td>
<td>Gedo divided into two conflicting administrations: One in the North (Luuq, Dolow and Beled-Hawa) supported by Ethiopia and another one in the South (Bardhere, Elwak and Garbaharey) supported by the TNG headed by Abdiqasim Salat Hassan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2005</td>
<td>National Reconciliation Processes in Arta Djibouti and Mbagathi Kenya. TNG/TFG</td>
<td>El-Adde peace accord where signed to reconcile two wings of SNF (Marehan) who were polarized by the conflict with Itihad. Marehans officially agreed to forget their differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>Conflict between Union of Islamic Courts and TFG</td>
<td>Relatively stability in Gedo since the focus was on Mogadishu. Most Militias and other warlords in the region migrated to Mogadishu. During this period, the Union of Islamic Courts has disintegrated. After the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia, the Al-Shabaab group has emerged and assumed the full control of Gedo region and other parts of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-PRESENT</td>
<td>TFG/ ASWJ and Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Increased regional intervention (Kenya and Ethiopia sending troops to Gedo). Polarized community where sub-clans support conflicting groups; massive population displacement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Peace Initiatives: Gedo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Bardera District</td>
<td>Rahanweyn &amp; Darod</td>
<td>Reconciliation brokered by UNISOM leading to development of local governance structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Bardera District</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Movement (Rahanweyn), Somali Patriotic Movement (Darod), and United Somali Congress (Hawiye)</td>
<td>Somali National Alliance established under Mohamed Farah Aideed. Evolved into Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council in 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Garbaharey District</td>
<td>Marehan sub-clans</td>
<td>Reconciliation among Marehan clans leading to the establishment of Gedo Region administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Belet-Hawa District</td>
<td>Marehan sub-clans</td>
<td>Reconciliation and discussions on the role of al-Ittihad al-Islamiya in Gedo Region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Bardera District</td>
<td>Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya and Somali National Front (Marehan)</td>
<td>Power sharing and the role of al-Ittihad al-Islamiya in Gedo Region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Garbaharey District</td>
<td>Somali National Front (Omar Haji Masallah faction) and Somali National Front (Mohamed Said Hersi &quot;Morgan&quot; faction)</td>
<td>Unification of the Somali National Front.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Bardera District</td>
<td>Marehan sub-clans</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and power-sharing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Garbaharey District</td>
<td>Marehan sub-clans</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and establishment of regional administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>El Wak District</td>
<td>Marehan and Garre</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and power-sharing arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Garbaharey District</td>
<td>Marehan sub-clans</td>
<td>Peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Garbaharey District</td>
<td>Marehan sub-clans</td>
<td>Peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. Middle Juba

Conflict Map: Middle Juba

Note: Numbers are linked to the numbers in the conflict list on page 31.
IV. Middle Juba

Introduction: Middle Juba

Middle Juba is one of the least developed regions of Somalia. Most of its basic infrastructure has been destroyed. Along with Lower Juba, Middle Juba is also, however, one of the most fertile regions of Somalia. Middle Juba has three administrative districts: Bu’ale, Jilib, and Saakow. According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Statistics in 2005, Middle Juba had a population of approximately 239,000. Various social groups including Absame (Ogaden/Darod), Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn), Ajuran, Hawiye sub-clans, Jareerweyne (Somali Bantu), and Dir sub-clans inhabit the region.

Social services and infrastructure are limited in the region. Schools and medical facilities are dysfunctional in most districts with the exception of Jilib Hospital which is relatively well maintained by the Samsam Foundation, an Islamic charity. Jilib town and the surrounding villages have the best infrastructure in Middle Juba with agricultural factories, large sugar and rice plantations, irrigation systems, and good piped water points, all developed by the Siyad Barre government. It should be noted that although this infrastructure is present, the economy still largely depends on livestock, livestock products, and agricultural products.

Key Findings: Middle Juba

• Clans in the region fought with each other prior to the take over of al-Shabaab in 2006. Clan rivalry was primarily resource-based.
• Middle Juba remains under the control of al-Shabaab. As a result, clan conflict in Middle Juba remains low.
• Various community centered peace initiatives were put in place, mainly before 2006, to promote peace and coexistence among warring clans.
• Social services and infrastructure are very limited in the region. Schools and medical facilities are dysfunctional in most areas with the exception of Jilib Hospital.

History of Conflict: Middle Juba

Unlike Gedo and Lower Juba where AMISOM now control most districts, Middle Juba region is fully under the control of al-Shabaab. Although the group has managed to promote stability the possible extension of AMISOM control to the region is likely to result in the re-emergence of conflict.

Key Political Actors: Middle Juba

Political actors are critical players in conflict affecting Middle Juba.

Al-Shabaab: Al-Shabaab remains the key political actor in Middle Juba. The region is believed to host many senior al-Shabaab officials whose identities remain secret. Recruitment of youths in the region is widespread. Prolonged wars in southern Somalia mean that most recruits usually already have basic military skills. Those that prove their military skills and ideological commitment are promoted. Top-ranking members are motivated by ideology. Low ranking local fighters usually join for financial reasons or out of anger over the deaths of friends or family members.

Somali Federal Government (SFG): The SFG has no officials on the ground in Middle Juba. Its predecessor, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), had officials assigned to the region but they too were not present due to security reasons.

Azania: Azania is a self-proclaimed administration encompassing Gedo, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba. Unlike al-Shabaab and the Ras Kamboni Brigade (RKB), Azania is a civilian administration which aspires to represent all clans within its territory. However, Azania has no officials, and little if any popular support on the ground in Middle Juba. Its representatives are based outside of Somalia. The principle goal of the Azania administration is to rid southern Somalia of al-Shabaab.
Political Actor Mapping: Middle Juba

**Actors**

- Al-Shabaab

**Districts**

- Bu'ale
- Sakow
- Jilib

**Major Clans**

- Bu'ale:
  - Absame
  - Sheikhal
  - Ajuran
  - Dabarre
  - Biyamal
  - Rer Shabelle

- Sakow:
  - Auliyan
  - Elay
  - Yantar
  - Macalinweyn
  - Geeladle
  - Ajuran
  - Rer Shabelle
  - Hawadle
  - Garjan
  - Asharaf
  - Gaaljeel
  - Haryen
  - Huber
  - Jibilie
  - Awramale

- Jilib:
  - Shanta
  - Shambaro
  - Sheikhal
  - Absame
  - Biyamal
  - Habar Gedir
  - Garre
  - Tunni
  - Jide
Capacity of Current Government Administration: Middle Juba

Bu’ale District: Bu’ale town is the regional capital of Middle Juba and an al-Shabaab stronghold. The district hosts the Absame (Darod), Shekhal, Ajuran (Hawiye) Dabarre (Digil / Rahanweyne), Biyamal (Dir) and Rer Shabelle (Jarerwenye). Al-Shabaab currently remains unopposed in the district. The district’s importance as the capital of Middle Juba means that it is likely to be the focus of a forthcoming advance by AMISOM troops. Bu’ale has poor infrastructure and is one of the least developed districts in Somalia. The only physical institution created by al-Shabaab in Bu’ale town is a mosque, which acts as the central venue for governance and social engagement. There is no running water or electricity and there are few schools in the district.

Jilib District: Jilib District has members of the Shanta Shambaro (Somali Bantu), Absame (Darod), Habr Gedir, Hawadle, Ajuran, Sheikhal (Hawiye), Garre, Tunni, Jide (Digil/Rahanweyn), and Biyamal and Warday (Dir) sub-clans. In 2006, Jilib town was the last defense position of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and affiliated militias aiming to prevent Ethiopian and TFG forces from approaching the city. Al-Shabaab has ruled Jilib District since 2007. Jilib has experienced relatively few clan disputes in the past two decades, though it has witnessed combat between other militant groups moving to and from Kismayo. Jilib District has the best infrastructure in Middle Juba, consisting of agricultural factories, large sugar and rice plantations, and irrigation systems developed by the Siyad Barre government. Jilib district has a relatively well-maintained hospital. Running water is available in some locations of Jilib town. The town is divided by a river. A bridge connecting the two sides has been repaired since it was damaged 10 years ago by militias.

Sakow District: Sakow District has remained under control of al-Shabaab, directly or via proxies, since 2006. The district is comprised of a sedentary agrarian population along the Juba River, with pockets of agro-pastoralists in other well-watered sites. Sakow district is home to the following clans: Awlahan (Ogaden/Darod), Elay, Yantar, Macalinweyne Haryen, Huber, Geeladle, Jilib and Assharaf (Mirilfle / Rahanweyn), Galjelic, Hawadle, Ajuran, Awralmare (Hawiye), Rer Shabele (Jarerwenye) and Garjan. Like Bu’ale, Sakow District has poor infrastructure and is one of the least developed areas of Somalia. There is no running water or electricity and there are few schools.

Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Middle Juba

Clans in the region fought with each other, primarily over resources, prior to the dominance of AS in 2006.

Conflict Profile: Middle Juba

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Intermittent since 1991</td>
<td>Jilib District</td>
<td>Inter-Clan Jareer (Somali Bantu) vs. Sheikhal &amp; Habar Gedir (Hawiye)</td>
<td>Political representation and access to resources.</td>
<td>Inactive &amp; unresolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Intermittent since 1988</td>
<td>Sakow District</td>
<td>Intra-Darod Absame vs. Marehan</td>
<td>Political representation and access to resources.</td>
<td>Inactive &amp; unresolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Intermittent since 1991</td>
<td>Bu’ale District</td>
<td>Inter-Clan Absame (Darod) vs. Ajuran (Hawiye) &amp; Dabarre (Rahanweyn)</td>
<td>Political representation.</td>
<td>Inactive &amp; unresolved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. Lower Juba

Conflict Mapping: Lower Juba

Note: Numbers are linked to the numbers in the conflict list on pages 42-43.
V. Lower Juba

Introduction: Lower Juba

Since the onset of state collapse, Kismayo has been hotly contested due to its strategic location and deep water port. It has changed hands many times since state collapse but has always been under the control of clan-based warlords or Islamists. Since January 1991, Kismayo has been fought over by the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali National Front (SNF), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), as well as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), al-Shabaab, and Hizbul Islam.

Lower Juba is Somalia’s most fertile territory. Agriculture and livestock are the main economic drivers of the region. The Juba River runs through the region. Exploitation of this important water resource mainly for irrigation has been hampered by the overall destruction of infrastructure. Most irrigation schemes collapsed as a direct result of the 1990s civil war. Longstanding conflicts forced farmers to abandon well maintained farmlands. Today only traditional farming methods are practiced. People in the region face an acute shortage of basic social and economic infrastructure, such as health and educational facilities, veterinary services, and access to safe drinking water. Orphaned children and households headed by women are widespread. This has resulted in high numbers of infant deaths, undernourished families, and a lack of education for children.

Lower Juba is home to several major social groups/clans including Darod sub-clans, Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn) sub-clans, Hawiye sub-clans, Dir sub-clans, the Jarerweyne communities and others. The region is currently under the control of various actors including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Somali National Army (SNA), and the Ras Kamboni Brigade (RKB). The forces are collectively described as anti-Shabaab forces. Al-Shabaab remains present, particularly in Jamame District. Although anti-Shabaab forces control most towns in the region, most rural territory remains under the control of al-Shabaab’s mobile units. These dynamics pose a security challenge to peace and stability in Lower Juba.

A summary of the current situation in Kismayo is as follows:

• There are five self-declared presidents representing separate clans and controlling more than 2,000 militia men.
• Small arms continue to flow into the city.
• Unemployed youth are at risk of joining militias or al-Shabaab.
• There is a large presence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) straining limited resources in the city.
• Returnees are trying to re-establish themselves in the city.
• The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), AMISOM, and the KDF are accused of siding with particular clans at the expense of others.
• The SFG is accused of being ‘anti-federalist’ by claiming that the establishment of Jubaland State is unconstitutional.
• Al-Shabaab is less than 25 kilometers from the city and continues to use guerilla warfare tactics.

The politics of the region has national and regional dimensions and it is essential that all parties are able to reach a compromise which will enable a negotiated settlement. This is vital for Somalia and the stability of the wider region.

Key Findings: Lower Juba

• There are over 40 sub-clans in the region making it one of the most diverse regions in Somalia.
• The main feature of the city is the seaport. Seaports provide an important source of revenue for authorities. Control of the port provides the resources necessary to extend control in the region. The struggle for control of resources along clan lines contributes to tensions in the city and in the region.
• The SFG maintains that the recent declaration of Jubaland State as a federal state is unconstitutional. The position held by stakeholders in Kismayo is that they have conducted a locally led process in line with the constitution.
• The region is currently under the control of various political actors including AMISOM, the SNA, and the RKB. Initially RKB established a local administration in Kismayo supported by the KDF. Later authority was declared over a new federal state of Jubaland.

• Renewed conflict in Jubaland region has its roots in civil war narratives and perspectives of the Darod and Hawiye clans. Currently, the primary clans in conflict include the Absame, Marehan, and Harti sub-clans (all Darod), and Hawiye sub-clans.

• Clan vendettas, compounded by historical grievances among clans, a scarcity of resources, discrimination and marginalization against particular groups, political struggles that have never created power sharing arrangements, and mistrust of political leadership are the key causes of conflict in the region.

• Various peace initiatives were instituted since 1991 with limited success.

• Basic social and economic infrastructure – such as health and educational facilities, veterinary services, access to safe drinking water, and justice facilities (police stations, courts, and correction facilities) are either lacking or limited.

History of Conflict: Lower Juba

Clan resource-based conflict

• In the 1990s the Mohamed Zubeir and Auliyahan (both Ogaden/Darod) competed for land and power around the town of Dhobley. The Muhamed Zubeir-Auliyahan accord of 1998 aimed to resolve the conflict that centered around Dhobley (with extended conflict dynamics reaching Badhadhe, Kismayo, Jilib, Bu’ale, Hagar, and Afmadow in Somalia, and Liboy, Garrisa, Wajir, Habaswein, Dadaab, and Eastleigh in Kenya). In 2000 Siyad Hussein's (Auliyahan) militia was ousted by Muhamed Zubeir militias from Dhobley. Security subsequently improved considerably and local clan elders took over using modest tax revenues from cross-border trade to create a small police force, administration, and peace committee. The Muhamed Zubeir-Auliyahan accord of 1998 was brokered by Absame elders (also Ogaden/Darod). The accord though effective was not documented and was imposed by the Absame elders on the warring sub-clans without substantial consultation or follow up. The conflict threatens to re-emerge in the wake of al-Shabaab defeat in the region.

• Tensions between the Auliyahan and the Marehan around control of the Diff cross border trade corridor (Hagar district) have been fuelled by the loss of Auliyahan influence in Bardera trade further south. Cross-border crime in the Diff trade corridor has been controlled by traditional elders.

• The lack of a common vision between the Absame (Darod) and Marehan on the future of the Juba River basin risks triggering old clan rivalries over resources and control of administrations (including Kismayo port, towns, and trade routes). The conflict is unresolved but currently inactive. The conflict could re-emerge if al-Shabaab militias are removed. From 2010 to 2013, RKB and al-Shabaab militias battled in both districts. Hagar remains under al-Shabaab control.

• In 1995 in Badade District there were several clashes between Harti and Ogaden (both Darod) sub-clans, clashes between Hawiye and Darod sub-clans in Badade and Kolbio, and clashes between Majeerteen and Ogaden sub-clans (both Darod) in Ras Kamboni.

• When the Absame were pushed out of Kismayu around 1995, they blocked trade routes towards Kenya, including Afmadow and Dhobley, in response.

• The key stakeholders in Lower Juba since Hawiye sub-clans were pushed out in the early 1990s have been Absame, Marehan and Harti sub-clans (all Darod).

Political power struggles

The region has been the scene of frequent fights between the conflicting clans and political actors since state collapse. Resources, political ideologies, and power struggles have been the causes of conflict in the region. Central to the conflict in Lower Juba is a question of territorial ownership and control over resources. The main players are Ogaden, Harti, and Marehan (Darod), and the Hawiye. They all make historical claims to the control of
Kismayo. The dispute is now largely between Darod clans—with Ogaden and Harti one on one side, fighting Marehan supported by the Hawiye. Since 1991, the Absame (Ogaden/Darod) have been frozen out of power in Kismayo by a combination of Harti, Marehan (Darod), and Haber Gedir (Hawiye) militias.

Key Political Actors: Lower Juba

Since the 1990s Kismayo has been the center of various Darod sub-clan power struggles. Under the leadership of warlord Barre Hiraale, the Marehan established the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) in 2001 in a bid to assert the Marehan control over Kismayo. In May 2013 with RKB controlling the city, Barre Hiraale returned to Kismayo by sea from Mogadishu. He claimed to come to visit his family who were already there and that he had no political intentions, creating suspicion among RKB and KDF/AMISOM forces. Marehan communities who felt politically marginalized by RKB in Kismayo, were empowered by his return. Soon after, Barre Hiraale began to organize Marehan militias to counter and challenge RKB authority. In late May when Sheikh Ahmed Madobe was selected as regional President at the Jubaland Conference in Kismayo, Barre Hiraale simultaneously declared himself president of the new state with the support of the Marehan. The Sheikhal (Hawiye), Awramale (Hawiye), and the Gaaljeel (Hawiye) all followed suit and also declared ‘presidents’ of Jubaland. This has increased tension greatly. There have been clan clashes within Kismayo resulting in Barre Hiraale’s expulsion from the city. He is now believed to be just outside of Kismayo with his militia. The other three clan-based ‘presidents’ have all gone to Mogadishu. Vying for political and territorial control has been the predominant factor inciting conflict and making political engagement difficult.

Ras Kamboni Brigade (RKB): The RKB is led by Sheikh Ahmed Madobe (Mohamed Zubeir/Ogaden/Darod). In 2006 the UIC/RKB alliance gained control of Kismayo port but in 2007 were defeated by the Ethiopia National Defence Force (ENDF) enabling the Marehan militia, led by Abdirizak Taano, to take control. In 2009 al-Shabaab, together with the RKB group led by Hassan Turki, defeated the Marehan militia and re-took Kismayo. Later in 2009 al-Shabaab pushed RKB out of Kismayo, leading to the sideling of Turki and the rise of Sheikh Ahmed Madobe as its leader with the help of Ibrahim Shukri. Madobe was initially allied with UIC and al-Shabaab. Madobe defected from al-Shabaab with many of his troops in 2009 and is now aligned with the KDF. In May 2013 Madobe was selected by 480 clan elders to be president of Jubaland in a process that was opposed by the SFG. Madobe also enjoys significant support from the Puntland administration, whose leaders favor a decentralized form of federalism, as well as a second federal state under Darod leadership.

Kenya Defense Force (KDF): The KDF ‘rehatted’ in July 2012 to join the AMISOM force deployed in the region. The KDF are based in AMISOM ‘Sector Two’ along the western side of Lower Juba, with key bases along the road running from west to east between Dhobley and Afmadow towns. In a diplomatic letter accidentally released to the press the SFG accused the KDF of ignoring its mandate under AMISOM by siding with RKB and supporting the establishment of a newly established Jubaland State in defiance of the Federal Government. In a recent AMISOM Summit in Kampala, Kenya agreed to hand over authority of Kismayo to the SFG. At the time of writing this had not happened.

Somali National Army (SNA): The SNA in Lower Juba is comprised of the Kenya-backed and Isiolo trained troops who officially fall under the authority of the SFG. The SNA, under the leadership of Brigadier General Ismail Sahardiid, seized Kismayo from al-Shabaab alongside RKB and the KDF in September 2013. In May 2013, shortly after the controversial Jubaland Conference that resulted in the selection of Sheikh Ahmed Madobe as president of Jubaland State, Ismail Sahardiid was replaced as Commander of the Juba Regions with Colonel Salah Makoma Mohamed taking over. In a statement made in late May, Salah Makoma Mohamed said that there were no SNA troops in Kismayo, only clan militias.

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): IGAD, comprised of several states in the region, supported the ‘Jubaland Initiative’ since mid-2012. Common interests between Kenya and Ethiopia formed the basis for the 2012 IGAD Grand Stabilization Plan for South Central Somalia, which seeks to establish the rule of law, a local administration, and to promote reconciliation through the creation of the regional Jubaland State. Kenya is believed to have been keen to establish a buffer-zone to protect its eastern borders. Influential Somali-Kenyans, such as the former Minster of Defense, Yusuf Haji, have been instrumental in Kenya’s role in the IGAD process, and the backing of RKB and Jubaland State. Ethiopia has also been keen to see a buffer-zone in southern Somalia though is cautious to avoid an administration sympathetic to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), an
## Kismayo: Conflict Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>LEADER(S)</th>
<th>CLAN</th>
<th>Who was in CONTROL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>G. Masale</td>
<td>Marehan/Ogaden/Majerteen</td>
<td>SNF/SPM/SSDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>G. Morgan</td>
<td>General Aidiid</td>
<td>SNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1999</td>
<td>General Gabyow</td>
<td>Habar Gidir/Ogaden</td>
<td>SPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2006</td>
<td>General Morgan</td>
<td>Habar Gidir/Ogaden</td>
<td>JVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Col. Barre Hirale</td>
<td>Ogaden Majerteen</td>
<td>UIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Ahmed Madobe</td>
<td>Marehan</td>
<td>TFG &amp; Ethiopian Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Bashir Jaratto</td>
<td>Ogaden</td>
<td>Marehan Militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/2012</td>
<td>Col. Afgadud</td>
<td>Ogaden</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-</td>
<td>Adan Joor</td>
<td>Ogaden</td>
<td>Hassan Turki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to date</td>
<td>Abdirizak Taano</td>
<td>Rahanweyn</td>
<td>Hassan Yacqub</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdirizak Taano</td>
<td>Ogaden</td>
<td>Ahmed Madobe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TIME**
- 1991
- 1992
- 1993
- 1994-1999
- 1999-2006
- 2006
- 2007
- 2008
- 2009/2012
- 2012-
to date

**Who was in CONTROL**
- SNF/SPM/SSDF
- USC
- SNA
- SPM
- JVA
- UIC
- TFG & Ethiopian Troops
- Marehan Militia
- Al-Shabaab
- AMISOM, Ras Kamboni Brigade & SNA

**LEADER(S)**
- G. Masale
- Col. Jesse
- G. Morgan
- General Gabyow
- General Morgan
- Col. Barre Hirale
- Ahmed Madobe
- Bashir Jaratto
- Col. Afgadud
- Adan Joor
- Abdirizak Taano
- Marehan
- Ogaden
- Majerteen
- Marehan
- Ogaden
- Ras Kamboni Brigade
- SNA

**CLAN**
- Marehan/Ogaden/Majerteen
- Habar Gidir
- Habar Gidir/Ogaden
- Ogaden
- Marehan
- Ogaden
- Majerteen
- Marehan
- Ogaden
- Rahanweyn
- Ogaden
Political Actor Mapping: Lower Juba

**Actors**
- KDF / RKB / SNA
- Al-Shabaab

**Districts**
- Kismayo
- Hagar
- Afmadow
- Badade
- Jamame

**Major Clans**
- Harti
- Absame
- Marehan
- Gaaljeel
- Awramale
- Sheikhal
- Warday
- Bajuni
- Digil and Mirfe
- Jareer
- Boni/Reebi
- Benadir
- Biyamal
- Other Hawiye

- Absame
  - Ogaden
  - Sheikhal
  - Dirisamo
  - Warday
  - Gadsen
  - Huber
  - Boni/Reebi
  - Geeladle

- Ogaden
  - Bajuni
  - Harti
  - Gaaljeel
  - Boni/Reebi
  - Warday
  - Awramale
  - Huber
  - Sheikhal

- Tunni
  - Darood
  - Rer Matan
  - Biyamal Shanta
  - Shamboro
  - Mushunguli Reebi
  - Warday
Kismayo Clan Alliances

Main Conflict Issues
- Administrative Control of the port city and its revenue
- Trade Opportunities
- Clan Rivalry/Suspicion

The Hawiye were pushed out of Kismayo in the 1990’s. After the Hawiye lost control the key players were the Marehan, Absame and Harti Clans.

KEY
- Blue: Major Player
- Light Blue: Other Clans
- Red: Conflict
- Gray: Alliance
Ethiopian rebel group fighting for independence of the Somali Region. There are reports that Ethiopia may not support RKB given their perceived Ogaden bias. Many Somalis have long accused neighbouring countries of having a destabilizing effect on Somalia. Kenyan and Ethiopian involvement in the Jubaland process is widely seen as a self-interested attempt to establish proxies.

Al-Shabaab: Al-Shabaab has fighters present across Lower Juba. Numbers are difficult to gauge, particularly since the loss of Kismayo city which led to the movement of an estimated 3,000-4,000 fighters to other parts of Lower Juba and other regions of Somalia including Bay, Gedo, and Middle Juba. However, pockets of al-Shabaab fighters regularly undertake hit-and-run attacks upon anti-Shabaab positions. Kismayo, like Afmadow and Dhibley, is free of al-Shabaab combat troops although residents and analysts suggest that the towns and their environs contain undercover operatives able to carry out attacks.

Somali Federal Government (SFG): While agreeing in principle that the three regions have the right to form a federal state, the SFG claims that Jubaland State, in its current form, violates constitutional provisions about the formation of member states. From Mogadishu’s perspective, Jubaland is being imposed on local inhabitants by their leaders, rather than emerging from a ‘bottom-up’ process in which local administrations are formed before deciding to merge regions. Mogadishu officials, as well as politicians in Lower Juba, Middle Juba, and Gedo regions, have expressed concern that the emerging Jubaland leadership will not represent the various clans that inhabit the region. Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon recently warned that the recent conference in Kismayo would “jeopardize the efforts of reconciliation, peacebuilding and statebuilding, create tribal divisions, and also undermines the fight against extremism in the region.” Both the SFG and IGAD have expressed concerns regarding the lack of inclusivity and transparency in the process that led to the formation of Jubaland State. Minority clans in the region, they argue, were insufficiently consulted, and subsequently underrepresented in the process.

Kismayo administration: A local administration was established by Sheikh Ahmed Madobe when the KDF and the RKB entered Kismayo in September 2012. The future of the administration led by Sheikh Ahmed Madobe is unclear following an AMISOM Summit in Kampala in which troop-contributing countries agreed that the Kismayo port and airport should be handed over to the SFG with a multinational force deployed to defend them. The administration was counting on the income from the facilities to support its activities.

Azania: Azania is a self-proclaimed administration encompassing Gedo, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba. Azania received support from Kenya before it shifted its allegiance to RKB. Kenya provided financial backing and technical assistance to former defense minister Mohamed Abdi Mohamed ‘Gandhi’ as president of an entity to be called Azania. Azania is a civilian administration which aspires to represent all clans falling within its territory. The administration, however, has no officials on the ground and has little if any popular support in Lower Juba. The primary aim of the Azania administration is to rid southern Somalia of al-Shabaab.

The Darod/Hawiye Contest

It is important to understand renewed conflict in Jubaland region from the separate narratives and perspectives of the Darod and Hawiye clans. The following are broad generalizations commonly espoused by members of each clan:

- **Darod perspective**: During the civil war Darod clans were expelled from all Hawiye dominated regions, particularly Mogadishu where Darod clans had dominated politics since the birth of the state. Mogadishu is now dominated by Hawiye clans—no local government officials are from non-Hawiye clans. Darod clans now feel politically and economically marginalized, and that Hawiye clans are unlawfully occupying their property. Many Darod communities in Mogadishu have been unable to return to their houses and thus reside in hotels. The SFG is seen by Darod communities as tool for promoting a Hawiye agenda. Now that the country has adopted a federal system, the Darod see an opportunity to establish a federal member state in their territory. Given that the Darod have little chance of dominating the economics and politics of Somalia in Mogadishu, Kismayo is seen as providing a suitable alternative.

- **Hawiye perspective**: Hawiye militias largely responsible for the downfall of the government in 1991 ‘reclaimed’ Mogadishu from the Darod who they associated with Siyad Barre and his regime. The Hawiye consider themselves the original inhabitants of Mogadishu and its environs, and therefore claim rightful ownership of the city. They believe, however, that Kismayo historically belonged to all Somalis. The Darod alone cannot decide
its fate. The Darod already dominate Puntland. The SFG has problems with the Puntland administration and does not want to see a similarly problematic administration in Jubaland. The Hawiye feel that the Darod are influenced by neighboring countries which would rather keep Somalia divided. Jubaland State is viewed by Hawiye communities as a buffer state for Kenya and Ethiopia rather than a federal state of Somalia.

Capacity of Current Government Administration: Lower Juba

Kismayo District: Kismayo District hosts the capital city of Lower Juba Region. Kismayo is the second largest metropolitan city in southern Somalia after Mogadishu, with approximately 40 sub-clans making it one of the most diverse cities in Somalia. The main feature of the city is the seaport. The majority of the population relies on livestock, agriculture, fishing, and trade. With the largest port in southern Somalia, located at the mouth of the Juba River in close proximity to Kenya, and as a commercial center for products from Somalia’s most fertile region, Kismayo is strategically extremely important. Since January 1991, Kismayo has been fought for by various militias including the United Somali Congress (USC) the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali National Front (SNF), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), Hizbul Islam, and al-Shabaab. Kismayo has been by described by Ken Menkhaus as ‘Somalia’s Sarajevo’ - a “chronically contested city, at times half-empty by armed conflict, at other times bloated with hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons. It has changed hands many times over the past two decades but has always been in the control of warlords or jihadists and has never enjoyed a day of good governance.”

Between 2006 and 2012 Kismayo was under the control of al-Shabaab. In 2012, an anti-Shabaab alliance led by the KDF and RKB removed the group from the city. In recent months other clan militias, including Marehan militias, have been attempting to reassert their control over various sections of the city. Clan conflict in Kismayo has been intermittent. Ogaden and Harti clans were reportedly squeezed out of Kismayo by a combination of Marehan and Haber Gedir militias in the 1990s. The key contestants since the Hawiye sub-clans were pushed out have been the Absame, Marehan, and Harti sub-clans (all Darod). Other sub-clans involved in on-going conflict in Kismayo include Warday (Dir), Gaaljeel, Sheikhal (both Hawiye), Huber (Mirifle/Rahanweyn), Bajuni, and Awramale (Hawiye). Conflict in Lower Juba Region is exacerbated by the complex clan composition of the area. It is an area where pastoral, agricultural, and coastal traditions meet. Lower Juba Region in general, and Kismayo city in particular, lack the relative clan and livelihood homogeneity of regions further north. The humanitarian situation in Kismayo city remains dire. The numbers of IDPs in the city remain high. Very few local and international NGOs are operating in the city. The top five priority needs are food, security, clean water, latrines, and health care services. Both IDPs and the host communities have similar needs.

Hagar District: Clan conflict in Hagar District has been between the Auliyahan (Ogaden) and the Marehan clans over control of the Diff trade corridor. Between 2010 and 2013 there were also several battles between RKB/KDF troops and al-Shabaab militias. Hagar District currently remains under the control of al-Shabaab. The district has no running water or electricity and there are few schools. Under al-Shabaab control, little is known about current social services offered in Hagar town.

Badhadhe District: Badhadhe District is largely populated by farmers and fishermen, though their activities have been hampered by conflict between al-Shabaab and the anti-Shabaab alliance. Badhadhe District is dominated by Maqabul and Tolomoge (Ogaden/Darod) sub-clans. AMISOM forces control approximately 80 per cent of the district with al-Shabaab controlling the remaining 20 per cent. Many of Somalia’s Islamist leaders have used the district as a safe-haven due to its strategic position. It also offers a forest in which insurgents can hide from both air and land attacks. Badhadhe District was also used by al-Shabaab to mount guerrilla attacks. Although AMISOM has taken control of the district, Badhadhe lacks a functioning administration that can sustain security gains. Residents have suggested that these challenges were well addressed by al-Shabaab. The district and the main town have very little infrastructure and no official civic buildings. There is a small airstrip near Ras Kamboni town.

Jamame District: Jamame District has been under the control of al-Shabaab since 2006. Its proximity to Kismayo and strategic importance has made it a perfect site for al-Shabaab forces expelled from other areas in Lower Juba to regroup. The district is primarily inhabited by the farming and fishing Biyamal (Dir) communities. Other clans include the Jareer (Somali Bantu) and Harti (Darod) throughout the district, and Sheikhal (Hawiye), Suri and Warday (Dir) and Tunni (Rahanweyn) in Jamame town. Jamame once had a large agricultural market used
by farmers in the region to trade produce. Agricultural infrastructure has been largely destroyed by conflict in the region. The district has no running water or electricity and there are few schools. Under al-Shabaab control, little is known about current social services offered in Jamame town.

**Afmadow District:** Dominated by the Mohamed Zubeir sub-clan of the Ogaden, Afmadow District is important in Lower Juba politics. Afmadow and Dhobley towns are under the control of AMISOM troops. Approximately 40 per cent of the district is held by anti-Shabaab forces though this territory remains prone to attacks by the group. Changes were made to the virtual TFG district-level administration after Afmadow town was taken from al-Shabaab. Most new district administrators were nominated by RKB with the selection of Abdihakim Omar Haji (Mohamed Zubeir) as the new mayor. There are primary and secondary schools, and a functioning health center funded by the Somali diaspora. The district also has a small airstrip. Dhobley town has a health center run by a respected diaspora surgeon, Abdi Aideed. Water points in Afmadow District are owned by private individuals. Water points in areas under al-Shabaab control are overseen by the group.

**Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Lower Juba**

**The most common forms of conflict in Lower Juba are:**

- **Political power struggles:** Conflict among political and military groups is based on political control and influence of the region, and in particular of Kismayo and its port.
- **Clan resource-based conflict:** Clan conflicts are primarily based on competition over resources such as land, grazing rights, water, farmlands, livestock, and access to humanitarian aid.

**Conflict Profile: Lower Juba**

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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Issues</th>
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<td><em>Armed Groups</em></td>
<td>Political domination of Kismayo city.</td>
<td>Active</td>
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| 2  | Intermittent since 1991 | Afmadow District – Dhobley town  | *Intra-Ogaden*  
Mohamed Zubeir vs. Auliyahan | Political representation, access to resources, and cross-border trade. | Inactive & unresolved |
| 3  | Intermittent since 1991 | Afmadow and Hagar districts  | *Intra-Darod*  
Marehan vs. Auliyahan | Political representation, access to resources, and cross-border trade. | Inactive & unresolved |
| 4  | Since 2003 | Badade District – Waldena village | *Inter-Clan*  
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| 5  | Intermittent since 1991 | Badade and Kismayo districts | *Inter-Clan*  
Absame & Harti (Darod) vs. Marehan (Darod) & Habar Gedir (Hawiye) | Political representation and access to resources. | Inactive & unresolved |
| 6  |  | Hagar District – Qaley village | *Intra-Darod*  
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* including United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), Somali National Front (SNF), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), al-Shabaab, Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and Ras Kamboni Brigade (RKB)
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<td>2007</td>
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Political Actors (Actual) and Clan Conflicts

REGIONAL TROOP MOVEMENTS, FINANCIAL & POLITICAL SUPPORT

Lower Juba as of June 2013

Political Actors (Actual) and Clan Conflicts

REGIONAL TROOP MOVEMENTS, FINANCIAL & POLITICAL SUPPORT

Lower Shabelle
Militia movement - Habar Gidir to support Hirale

Gedo Region
Marehan militia to support Hirale

Mogadishu
Hawiye Militia to support Hirale

Galgadud
Walaalaha Galgadud Militia to support Hirale

FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Puntland (Garowe) - - - →
Financial & Political support to Ahmed

Garissa (Kenya) - - - →
Financial & Political support to Ahmed

Jigjiga (Ethiopian Zones) - - - →
Financial & Political support from Ogaden to Ahmed Madowe

LEGEND
★ National Capital
★ Major Town
VI. Lower Shabelle

Conflict Mapping: Lower Shabelle

**Note:** Numbers are linked to the numbers in the conflict list on pages 55-57.

Lower Shabelle as of June 2013

**Political Actors (Actual) and Clan Conflicts**

**LOWER SHABELLE REGION**

- **KEY**
  - Regional boundary
  - District boundary
  - Al Shabaab Controlled Areas
  - AMISOM/SNA Controlled Areas
  - Major Town
    - Village

**CONFLICT LEGEND**

- Political based conflicts
- Resource based conflicts
- Both Political & Resource based conflicts

**Note:** Numbers are linked to the numbers in the conflict list on pages 55-57.
Clan Chart: Lower Shabelle

- Biyamal
  - Rahanweyn
    - Mirifle
    - Leysan
  - Digil
  - Jide
  - Bageli
  - Geledi
  - Tunni
  - Garre
  - Irole
  - Armo
  - Dubane Digil
  - Shanta Caleemo
  - Rer Barawe
  - 12 Koofi

- Benadir
- Eyle
- Jarerwenye
- Hawlye

- Wardaan
- Hintire
- Abgal
- Habar Gedir
- Hawadle
- Murusade
- Gorgante
- Gaaljeel
- Sheikhal
VI. Lower Shabelle

Introduction: Lower Shabelle

Lower Shabelle Region lies south-west of Mogadishu, and is bordered to the south by the Lower Juba, to the east by the Indian Ocean and Mogadishu, to the north by Middle Shabelle, and to the west by Bay. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated the population to be approximately 850,000 in 2005 making it one of the most populous regions in the country. It has eight districts: Marka, Afgoye, Wanlaweyn, Barawe, Sablale, Qoryoley, Awdhegle, and Kurtunwaarey. Livelihoods in the region are classified under five categories: agricultural, agro-pastoralist, pastoralist, fishing, and urban sedentary.

Clan conflict remains widespread in Lower Shabelle Region. Triggering factors include land invasion, political, social, and economic marginalization, and social atrocities. According to the respondents, stronger, well-armed and resourced farac (‘new settler’) communities tend to dominate the asal (‘original inhabitant’) communities. Farac communities from central regions migrated south and gained control of valuable resources such as farmland. These dynamics remain largely unresolved and will be future political fault lines.

Efforts to establish local governance structures in the Lower Shabelle Region have faced numerous challenges leading to their collapse. Peace agreements have been poorly implemented. There remain high levels of suspicion among clans to the extent that many consider the state to be an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering the clans that control it at the expense of the clans that don’t. A clan that feels insufficiently represented in local government is likely to oppose it. These issues and concerns must be adequately addressed by the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and the current local administration for peace to be realized in the region.

Key Findings: Lower Shabelle

• Political, social, and economic marginalization, farmland invasion, and social atrocities are the principal conflict triggers.

• Marginalization and discrimination have heightened inter-clan mistrust in the four regions covered, and hindered the establishment of stable governance structures that support and serve all communities equally. Social atrocities—including rape, forced marriages, forced labor, forced taxation, disappearances, and killings—are mechanisms by which dominant clans express and maintain their power over the ‘other’.

• Resource-based Conflict: Clan conflicts are primarily based on competition over resources such as land tenure, grazing rights, water, farmlands, livestock, and the distribution of humanitarian aid, or are motivated by revenge killings.

History of Conflict: Lower Shabelle

Conflict in Lower Shabelle can be divided into four categories: socio-economic marginalization, political domination, social atrocities, and land invasion. Political and military control is seen as the surest way of accessing resources in the region. Competition over political and territorial control of the region continues to push weaker clans to the peripheries and has resulted in the militarization of politics in Lower Shabelle. Marginalization has heightened inter-clan mistrust in the region, which has subsequently hindered the establishment of stable governance structures.

In conflict situations, social atrocities, including rape, forced marriages, forced labor, forced taxation, and assassinations, are tools for oppression. In Lower Shabelle, social atrocities are mechanisms by which dominant clans express and maintain their dominance and power over other clans. According to the key informants interviewed, non-armed and minority clan members are often forced to work on farms without pay, and to pay taxes on their properties. There are frequent reports of plans among marginalized groups to retaliate against the dominant clans.

Farmland invasion is a complex issue in Lower Shabelle with the potential for fuelling extended periods of conflict in the region. The issue dates back to the nineteenth century when Italian colonizers arrived in the region. According to Biyamal (Dir) and Wacdaan (Hawiyeye) communities, there was an agreement between the Biyamal and Italian settlers in 1907 where farmland was offered to the Italians to develop banana plantations. The Biyamal and the Wacdaan were to remain shareholders of the plantations and have their land returned when the contract expired.
after a period of 50 years. After 50 years the agreement was not renewed. Since then, the farmland has changed hands several times but has never been returned to the Biyamal or Wacdaan. In 1969, Siyad Barre’s government nationalized all Italian farmland to be used for government development projects, or to be given to the political elite. Following state collapse in 1991, various clan militias occupied government owned farmland in the region. In 2009 al-Shabaab gained control of all government owned farmland in the region. According to respondents al-Shabaab redistributed some of the land to its leaders.

Key Political Actors: Lower Shabelle

Political actors are critical players in conflicts affecting Lower Shabelle Region. Competition for territorial control—particularly farmland—has been the primary factor inciting conflict. Most political actors in the region are currently allied with the SFG, local administrations, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) against al-Shabaab. Although political actors are engaged in armed conflict, they also provide security in areas under their control. Political actors, however, have limited capacity to provide social services in the region.

Somali National Army (SNA): The SFG maintains a SNA presence in Lower Shabelle, fighting alongside AMISOM against al-Shabaab.

Local administrations: A local administration in Lower Shabelle is led by Governor Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur Sidi, who was appointed by the TFG. The SFG officials are currently in process to appoint an Interim Administration.

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): AMISOM is supporting the SNA troops fighting al-Shabaab. Allied anti-Shabaab forces currently control Marka, Afgoye, and Wanaaweyn districts in Lower Shabelle. Lower Shabelle falls under AMISOM Sector One, consisting of Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, and Benadir (Mogadishu) regions held by approximately 9,500 troops from Uganda and Burundi.

Al-Shabaab: Al-Shabaab has exerted temporary and, at times, sustained control over strategic locations in Lower Shabelle. The group engages guerrilla warfare tactics to fight against SNA troops and AMISOM peacekeepers in the region. Currently, al-Shabaab control Barawe, Qoryoley, Sablale, and Kurtunwarey districts in Lower Shabelle.

Clan Analysis: Lower Shabelle

From the interviews and focus groups, Biyamal (Dir), Digil (Rahanweyn), 12 Koofi (Benadiri), and Wacdaan (Hawiye) sub-clans are believed to be the asal (‘original inhabitant’) communities of Lower Shabelle region. Hawiye sub-clans, including Habar Gedir, Abgal, Murusade, and Hawadle, from Mogadishu and the central regions, are considered farac (‘new settler’) communities. It is only after the collapse of the State, that the farac communities became militarily, economically and politically dominate in the Region. There were led by powerful clan militias that arrived and occupied the area, primarily after the collapse of the state in 1991 and before the rise of the UIC in 2006. Eyle (minority) and Jareer (Somali Bantu), are minority groups in the region. In the absence of the state, clan affiliation remains an important source of protection in the region. Clan identities can be manipulated to acquire control over resources and power.

Capacity of Current Government Administrations

Various efforts have been made to establish governance institutions in Lower Shabelle region. The efforts were largely initiated by local communities through local reconciliation initiatives. The collapse of the state led to the deterioration of social services in Lower Shabelle. The region is deficient of essential services such as health, education, water, and sanitation facilities.

Marka District: The port city of Marka, which serves as the capital of Lower Shabelle, is the administrative and business centre of Marka District. It lies approximately 90km south of Mogadishu. Marka District is home to the Biyamal (Dir), Digil (Rahanweyn), 12 Koofi (Benadiri), Jareer (Somali Bantu), and Hawiye sub-clans. According to UNDP 2005 statistics, the district has a population of approximately 192,939 persons. Marka has experienced inter- and intra-clan conflicts mainly between the Biyamal and Hawiye clans over social, political, and economic competition. Like other districts in Lower Shabelle, ascension by clan to the leadership of an area is seen as a move towards institutionalizing the group’s claim over territory. Accordingly the Biyamal, Digil, and 12 Koofi communities, who claim historical rights to the region argue that the farac communities committed social atrocities against them. The Biyamal specifically claim that they have been persecuted by the farac since 1993.
Political Actor Mapping: Lower Shabelle

**Actors**
- AMISOM & SNA
- Al-Shabaab

**Districts**
- Wanlaweyn
- Afgoye
- Marka
- Qoryoley
- Barawe
- Sablale
- Kurtunwarey
- Awdegle

**Major Clans**
- Gaaljeel
- Shanta
- Alemood
- Garre
- Jareer
- Eyle
- Geledi
- Wadaan
- Jareer
- Hintire
- Gorgate
- Sheikhal
- Jaziro
- Biyamal
- 12 Koofi
- Jareer
- Digil
- Hawiye
- Jide
- Garre
- Jareer
- Biyamal
- Hawiye
- Dubane
- Darbane
- Rer Barawe
- Tunni
- Jareer
- Biyamal
- Hawiye
- Jide
- Tunni
- Jareer
- Biyamal
- Leysan
- Hawiye
- Bagedi
- Garre
- Sheikhal
Afgoye District: Afgoye is an agricultural district in the south-east of Lower Shabelle, approximately 30km north-west of Mogadishu. The Shabelle River divides Afgoye town. The district is home to numerous Somali clans. According to UNDP Statistics, Afgoye District has a population of approximately 211,712 persons, most of whom depend on agriculture and livestock. Geledi (Rahanweyn), Wacdaan, Hintire, Gorgaarte, Shec (all Hawiye), and Jareer (Somali Bantu) sub-clans are present in the district.

The influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the region, caused by conflict between Ethiopia and the UIC (2007-2008), conflict between AMISOM and al-Shabaab (2010-2012), and the recent famine (2011), has exerted huge pressure on essential resources and services such as clean water, food, hygiene facilities, farm and grazing land, and basic supplies. Competition for scarce resources threatens to fuel clan conflict in the district. Political and administrative control of Afgoye also drives clan conflict in the district. This is demonstrated by the frequency with which the local administration has changed hands. After the fall of government in 1991, non-local clan militias gained control of the district, followed by Hizbul Islam, then al-Shabaab, and finally by Sheikh Sharif's nominated administration led by District Commissioner, Abdullahi Abdi Ahmed Ibey.

Barawe District: The capital of the district is the port town of Barawe. Barawe District is home to non-armed and socially marginalized groups. The original inhabitants of the city, including the Rer Barawe (minority) and Tunni (Digil), were displaced by farac clan militias. In 2005, the UNDP estimated the population of Barawe District at 57,652 persons. Barawe remains under the control of al-Shabaab. Before the group gained control of the district in 2009, Barawe town was held by farac clan militias. According to interviews with key informants militias have committed atrocities on locals including rape and killings, forced marriage, political and economic domination, and illegal taxation. Although al-Shabaab managed to stabilize the district by suppressing clan conflicts, it has failed to provide essential social services including health, education, and clean water.

Sablale District: Located in the south-east of Lower Shabelle Region, between 1991 and 2004, Sablale district was under control of farac clan militias. The district is currently under the control of al-Shabaab. Clan conflict in Sablale revolves around political control and clan domination, rape, illegally held and occupied private property, and forced marriages. Local conflict resolution mechanisms in the district are inactive. There is a need for local reconciliation, the return of the illegally and forcefully held private property including farmlands, and installation of a just administration headed by local inhabitants for lasting peace.

Qoryoley District: Qoryoley is an agricultural district with an estimated population of 134,205 persons according to 2005 UNDP statistics. The district is inhabited by the Jareer (Somali Bantu), Jide (Rahanweyn), Hawiye sub-clans, Biyamal (Dir), and Garre (Digil/Rahanweyn) clans. Clan conflict in Qoryoley district has been a function of territorial control and expansion. Conflicts between Habar Gedir and Garre sub-clans and between Jareer and Jide sub-clans were both resolved. Between 1991 and 1993, the district administration was under the control of farac clan militias during the UNOSOM period. Following UNOSOM's departure the district was controlled by warlord, Yusuf Mohamed Siad (Indha Adde). Al-Shabaab gained control of the district in 2008.

Awdhegle District: Awdhegle district is located 58km west of Mogadishu. The district is home to Garre and Geledi (Rahanweyne) and Sheikhal (Hawiye) sub-clans. Awdhegle District is mostly inhabited by non-armed social groups. There is no reported traditional clan conflict in the district. There is a strong council of elders that effectively mediate conflicts as they arise. Earlier clan conflicts in the district were due to political domination by farac clan militias who established a local administration. A new administration, nominated by former TFG president, Abdullahi Yusuf was later ousted by al-Shabaab. It is anticipated that a local administration nominated by the SFG will receive local support.

Kurtunwaarey District: Kurtunwaarey District is home to various clans including Jide (Rahanweyn), Tunni (Rahanweyn), Biyamal (Dir), Jareer (Somali Bantu), Leysan (Rahanweyn), and Hawiye sub-clans. After the collapse of the state in 1991, Kurtunwaarey District fell under the control of farac militias until al-Shabaab seized control. Former TFG president, Abdullahi Yusuf attempted to nominate a local administration which was highly contested. Clan conflicts, between Habar Gedir (Hawiye) and Garre (Digil/Rahanweyn) on one side and Jide (Rahanweyn) and Hawadle (Hawiye) on the other side, erupted over administrative control. There was also conflict over political control of Kurtunwaarey town between Jide sub-clans and al-Shabaab. Political and economic domination by farac clans have also provoked conflict in Kurtunwaarey District. There are traditional conflicts arising over competition for water and grazing lands, and disputes over clan boundaries. Conflict may reemerge when al-Shabaab are
Italian and Biyamal community enter a year farming land agreement

Said Barre Government nationalized all Italian farming lands

Clan militia from outside the region overtake and occupy government owned farming lands

Al-Shabaab takes over the government owned farms from clan militia and gives to AS leaders and supporters
forced out of the district. There is no active council of elders that can facilitate negotiations and integration.

**Wanlaweyn District:** Wanlaweyn District is home to Somali clans including the Shanta Caleemo (Rahanweyn), Gaaljeel (Hawiye), Eyle (minority), Garre (Digil/Rahanweyn), and Jareer (Somali Bantu). The district has not experienced incidences of intrusion by outside clan militias. Conflict between Shanta Caleemo and Gaaljeel clans in 1994 over water and pasture was resolved. Conflict between Gaaljeel and Abgal clans occurring between 1994 and 2011 over pasture and farming land has not been resolved and may reemerge. Prior to al-Shabaab takeover of the district, a local administration was nominated by former Transitional National Government (TNG) president, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan. A local administration, nominated by the Lower Shabelle governor to take over from al-Shabaab was rejected by the local population who were not consulted. Clan conflict in the district revolves around water, pasture, and political power sharing. Local reconciliation on power sharing is necessary before the next administration is established.

**Conflict mapping and Analysis: Lower Shabelle**

The most common forms of conflict in Lower Shabelle are:

- **Marginalization and discrimination** have heightened inter-clan mistrust in the four regions covered, and hindered the establishment of stable governance structures that support and serve all communities equitably. Social atrocities—including rape, forced marriages, forced labor, forced taxation, disappearances, and killings—are mechanisms by which dominant clans express and maintain their power over the ‘other’.

- **Political based Conflict:** Conflict among both political and security groups is based on political control and influence of the region, and in particular its port in Barawe.

- **Resource-based Conflict:** Clan conflicts are primarily based on competition over resources such as land tenure, grazing rights, water, farmlands, livestock, and the distribution of humanitarian aid, or are motivated by revenge killings.

**Conflict Profile: Lower Shabelle**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Since 1993</td>
<td>Marka District</td>
<td><em>Inter-Clan</em> Biyamal (Dir) vs. Habar Gedir (Hawiye)</td>
<td>Political representation and access to resources.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1993</td>
<td>Marka District</td>
<td><em>Inter-Clan</em> Biyamal (Dir) vs. Abgal (Hawiye)</td>
<td>Political representation and access to resources.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1993</td>
<td>Barawe District</td>
<td><em>Intra-Hawiye</em> Hawadle vs. Habar Gedir</td>
<td>Political representation.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>Wanlaweyn District</td>
<td><em>Inter-Clan</em> Shanta Caleemo (Rahanweyn) vs. Gaaljeel (Hawiye)</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
<td>Resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1994</td>
<td>Wanlaweyn District</td>
<td><em>Intra-Hawiye</em> Gaaljeel vs. Abgal</td>
<td>Access to resources</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Governance Timeline in Lower Shabelle

1992-1993: USC Administration
- Lacked the backing of locals and collapsed.

1993-1995: UNISOM Administration
- Was accepted by locals.

1996-1997: SNA Administration
- Lacked the backing of locals and collapsed.

1999-2001: Indhacde Administration
- Lacked the backing of locals and collapsed.

2002-2005: Abdullahi Yusuf Administration
- Lacked the backing of locals and collapsed.

2006-2008: Al Shabaab Administration
- Was defeated by AMISOM & SNA.

2009 - PRESENT: Sheikh Sharif Administration
- Currently in place but contested by locals.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Conflict Type</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Resolution</th>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Afgoye District</td>
<td>Intra-Hawiye</td>
<td>Murusade vs. Abgal</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
<td>Resolved</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Kurtunwaarey</td>
<td>Inter-Clan</td>
<td>Habar Gedir, Abgal &amp; Sheikhal (Hawiye) vs. Jodow (Rahanweyn)</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Afgoye District</td>
<td>Inter-Clan</td>
<td>Garre (Digil/Rahanweyn) vs. Abgal (Hawiye)</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
<td>Resolved</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Afgoye District</td>
<td>Inter-Clan</td>
<td>Hintire (Hawiye) vs. Garre (Digil/Rahanweyn)</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
<td>Resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Barawe District</td>
<td>Inter-Clan</td>
<td>Abgal (Hawiye) vs. Tunni (Rahanweyn)</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
<td>Resolved</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>Inter-Clan</td>
<td>Habar Gedir (Hawiye) vs. Garre (Digil/Rahanweyn)</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
<td>Resolved</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>Jareer (Somali Bantu) vs. Jodow (Rahanweyn)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resolved</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>Inter-Clan</td>
<td>Jide (Rahanweyn) vs. Habar Gedir (Hawiye)</td>
<td>Access to resources.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 2009</td>
<td>Afgoye District – Mareerey village</td>
<td>Inter-Clan</td>
<td>Hintire (Hawiye) vs. al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Political representation.</td>
<td>Active</td>
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**Peace Initiatives: Lower Shabelle**

<table>
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<th>Issue</th>
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<td>Death</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Mubarak</td>
<td>Caye and Bagadi</td>
<td>Death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Mubarak</td>
<td>Salaybam &amp; Bagadi</td>
<td>Death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Mubarak</td>
<td>Abgal &amp; Bagadi</td>
<td>Land and farm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mubarak</td>
<td>Garre &amp; Bagadi</td>
<td>Farm land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Afgio</td>
<td>Abgal &amp; Bagadi</td>
<td>Farm land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Barawe</td>
<td>Tuni &amp; Abgal</td>
<td>Pasture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>DarAl-salam</td>
<td>Bimal &amp; Bagadi</td>
<td>Pasture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Qorylie</td>
<td>Jiide &amp; Garre</td>
<td>Pasture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Qorylie</td>
<td>Jide &amp; H/Gidir</td>
<td>Land</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
VII. Annex A: Methodology

Somalia, with a population of more than 10.7 million people, has been without effective central government since 1991. Somalia’s development has been severely curtailed by widespread conflict, negatively affecting nearly all development indicators. The Multidimensional Poverty Index of Somalia shows a very high incidence of poverty at 81.2 per cent, with 65.5 per cent of the population categorized as living in ‘severe poverty’. The conflict has affected women disproportionately, with the majority of the population living in ‘severe poverty’ being women. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) has continued to increase (1,136,143 and 1,132,963 respectively according to the United Nations Refugee Agency, UNHCR). Drought and subsequent flooding in 2011 exacerbated the already strained situation in Somalia.

The purpose of this conflict mapping and analysis study is to:

• Assess, analyze, and determine the current status of conflict in southern Somalia.
• Map areas of potential conflict re-emergence during the transitional period.
• Identify possible conflict prevention and peacebuilding measures which could assist in the stabilization process of newly accessible areas.

The assessment studied the causes of conflict and conflict actors. Additionally the assessment identified key actors in each of the regions, their perceived political and economic interests, and their relationships with each other.

The study used the following methods to gather and collate information:

• Literature Review (relying particularly on information collected by Pact and the Centre for Research and Dialogue, Mogadishu).
• Focus group discussions with various clans and civil society organizations.
• Key informant interviews.
• Direct observation and field visits.
• Qualitative semi-structured questionnaires.
• Validation workshops.

Consultants hired by Somali CEWERU undertook the study. Researchers from Conflict Dynamics International provided a detailed political actors mapping for the four regions. A total of 570 individuals were interviewed, either in person or as member of a focus group discussion, in the regions or in Mogadishu. Interviewees included clan elders, religious leaders, politicians, youth, women, and representatives of minority groups and local authorities from the regions. Validation workshops were held to discuss the findings of the assessments with 45 stakeholders representing all regions invited to participate. The aim of the validation workshop was to cross-check and validate information gathered, to ensure information consistency, and to create awareness among peacebuilding actors.

The study was cross-sectional in design. Both qualitative and quantitative were used to gather information. Informants were selected to represent all groups involved in or affected by conflict in the region. A basic literature review was conducted to provide background information on the regions. All information gathered was analyzed in Nairobi.

For the safety of the researchers and participants, inhabitants residing in areas still occupied by al-Shabaab were transported to areas under government control for interviews. This limited the free participation of individuals residing in areas under al-Shabaab control.

The main challenges experienced during the assessment included the following:

• Many officials were reluctant to discuss the limited capacity and territorial reach of the SFG.
• Many participants were reluctant to share their identification for fear of reprisals from al-Shabaab.
• Many participants avoided criticizing al-Shabaab, particularly in focus group meetings, for fear of reprisals.
• Many participants were concerned that the assessment was an intelligence gathering mission for foreign agencies.